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Highlights
• Changing market realities in natural gas engender significant challenges for 
Gazprom in both Europe and Russia alike. The trend consists in a growing 
number of suppliers domestically, with a boost of independent gas production, 
and internationally, with a more liquid gas and LNG trade. 
• Transition towards a new market model in the EU affects existing pricing mecha-
nisms and contracts. For the Russian gas export monopolist a separation between 
pipeline capacity and commodity markets also generates risks of capacity-supply 
mismatch and constitutes barriers to new pipeline projects. 
• In Russia itself, Gazprom faces competition from fast-evolving gas producers 
such as Rosneft and Novatek.  The two companies are striving for the gas export 
de-monopolisation, which already occurred for Russia’s LNG. 
• Current low price context reverts the situation in Gazprom’s favour. In particu-
lar, Gazprom’s production competitiveness improves, oil-indexation regains a 
rationale, while natural gas demand growth rates somewhat restarted, whereas 
domestic competitors experience severe difficulties. 
• However, main political barriers, conflicts surrounding Ukraine and diversifi-
cation strategies subsist. A more positive market context stems from exogenous 
factors rather than from Gazprom’s own strategies. 
• It may become essential to use the positive market context to demonstrate 
flexibility on contracts, pricing and hub-based exports. An ability to adapt does 
not deny a more vivid defense of the company’s views especially regarding new 
projects and capacities. Nevertheless, pipeline over-capacity loses attractiveness.
• On a smaller scale, investments into small liquefaction capacities might be a 
starting point to depoliticize Gazprom’s supplies to Europe.  
• A transit agreement with Ukraine remains strategically important alternative to 
investments into new pipelines. 
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 Continued di  culties for Gazprom
Last year’s working paper entitled ‘Between a rock and a hard 
place: international market dynamics, domestic politics and 
Gazprom’s strategy’, published by the Florence School of Reg-
ulation, highlighted the major issues facing the Russian gas 
export monopoly. Among other issues, the paper pointed to 
the signi cant pressure on Gazprom stemming from EU market 
liberalisation. In particular, Gazprom faces considerable chal-
lenges as a result of various regulations relating to capacity 
anti-hoarding mechanisms. Consequently, South Stream, 
Gazprom’s major export project, has been inde nitely post-
poned. In addition, Gazprom and its consortium partners face 
regulatory di  culties in relation to OPAL, the German onshore 
branch of Nord Stream. In this case, Gazprom may use only 
50% of capacity for its long-term supplies, while the other 50% 
needs to be purchased annually from the capacity market. Rus-
sia’s stated aim of bypassing EU regulations by backing a new 
Turkish Stream project did not come to fruition, on the face of 
it due to the a ermath of the Moscow-Ankara disputes over 
Syria. However, it should be noted that the Turkish Stream pro-
ject was dogged by a structural problem: it did not address how 
to ship gas to delivery points in Central and Eastern Europe, 
to which Russian gas has to be shipped pursuant to long-term 
contracts. In the meantime, territorial and pricing con icts 
with Ukraine increased the urgency of the need to  nd alterna-
tive transit routes. 
In addition to regulatory complexities, the newly evolving 
market context, characterised by LNG in ows and increasing 
liquidity in gas hubs, led to a reconsideration of oil-indexed 
pricing.  us, more  exible take-or-pay clauses and price dis-
counts on traditional oil-indexation became the subject of dis-
putes between Gazprom and European gas companies. Despite 
Gazprom’s  rm position backing oil-indexation and long- term 
take-or-pay contracts, European enterprises have succeeded in 
requiring it to adapt its contracts to the new situation. 
On top of all of this, the European Commission has launched 
an antitrust monitoring exercise against the Russian supplier. 
Although Gazprom initially rebu ed the accusations made, it 
is now increasingly concerned with  nding a compromise with 
Brussels. As oil-indexation is among the issues raised as repre-
senting anti-competitive behaviour, the European Commission 
has entered into a new policy area – that of gas prices. As a result, 
the European institutions have forged market norms based on 
hubs. Since these hubs are located in Europe, Gazprom has 
been excluded from the process of creating norms in respect 
of the gas markets. 
In parallel, Gazprom has been facing competition from other 
Russian enterprises (Rosne  and Novatek) that wish to break 
into export markets. Paradoxically enough, Gazprom’s com-
petitors inside Russia have made similar demands: for access 
to networks and liquidity in gas trade.  e changes that have 
taken place domestically include the creation of the SPB gas 
hub, from which gas can, hypothetically, be imported directly 
by Europeans via direct exchange trade. Russia’s Federal Anti-
Monopoly Service has o en insisted on the transparent and 
non-discriminatory allocation of Gazprom’s pipeline capacity. 
In a similar vein, it would like to see a proportion of gas exports 
being allocated to the SPB hub. Consequently, Gazprom’s in u-
ence has diminished inside Russia and has been signi cantly 
challenged in Europe.
Finally, yet importantly, the di  culties experienced by Gazprom 
in securing  nancial agreement with China to implement the 
Power of Siberia pipeline project harmed its political position 
both within Russia and internationally. Gazprom’s objective of 
demonstrating strong export diversi cation ability appears to 
be subject to certain constraints.
Positive market context
Still, the situation does not seem to have been altogether nega-
tive for Gazprom. Moreover, the company appears to have rein-
forced its position over the past year. Its good fortune in this 
respect may largely be explained by reference to market trends 
which can be summarised along four main lines:
Regaining the oil indexati on rati onale. Perhaps paradoxically, 
the fall in hydrocarbon prices has in fact bene tted Gazprom. At 
 rst glance, oil-indexation seems to have undergone a gradual 
process of depoliticisation.  e decline in the oil price drove 
the price down to USD 6 per MBTU for 2015, and this  gure 
will decline still further when the oil price hits bottom. Con-
sequently, European companies have not been making many 
complaints regarding Gazprom’s pricing mechanisms.  e low 
price may even prove to be a signi cant barrier preventing new 
supply sources from breaking into European markets. 
Decline in producti on costs. Gazprom’s production costs have 
declined mostly due to a fall in service costs and the exchange 
rate between the Russian rouble and the US dollar.  is favour-
able exchange rate has been a factor in Gazprom’s wellhead 
price. At the end of 2015 and in early 2016, conversion rates 
brought about a reduction in costs in dollars of at least 30%. 
Russian gas production costs averaged USD 30 per tcm mostly 
as a result of this. Hence, Gazprom now also has the possibility 
of reducing the gas price and thus imposing itself as the most 
competitive supplier to Europe. 
Domesti c competi tors’ export projects have lost momentum. 
Initial ambitions by Rosne  and Novatek to export LNG appear 
to have become more di  cult to implement. Both major LNG 
projects –  Yamal LNG promoted by Novatek and Sakhalin-1 
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invested in by Rosne  –  xed elevated price benchmarks 
between USD 11 and 13 per MBTU, on the basis that the Asian 
markets would then be natural buyers for the new liquefaction 
projects. However, the gas price has since halved and both pro-
jects seem to have been postponed. In this context, Gazprom 
has reinstated itself as the main exporter of Russian gas via 
existing supply chains. Furthermore, it has fought o  the pro-
cess of export demonopolisation called for by its competitors. 
Rising export volumes via long-term contracts.  e SPB gas 
hub has traded way below initial hopes, with the price not dif-
fering much from that achieved under Gazprom’s long-term 
contracts. Furthermore, while Gazprom opened export trade 
in September 2015 it did not attract any strong interest from 
European consumers. By contrast, in 2015, its exports to Ger-
many increased by 14%, to Italy by 12%, and to France by 
more than 30%. Furthermore, the  rst quarter of 2016 marked 
growth in the volumes exported by Russia of 36% compared to 
the previous year. 
It remains to be seen whether market reinforcement will 
become a structural trend or remain a result of the decline in 
the price. One can argue that a price decline usually tends to 
stabilise existing supply chains, while diversi cation is usually 
stimulated by a higher price. 
 e way forward?
 e paradox of Gazprom’s situation lies in the fact that even its 
growing competitiveness does not decrease the level of politici-
sation of Russian gas supplies.  e main barrier for Gazprom’s 
business remains at the level of political considerations con-
cerning security, either perceived or real. For instance, some 
LNG import projects in the Baltic region have continued despite 
the new price context. In a similar vein, Gazprom faces opposi-
tion to Nord Stream-2, its new pipeline project, again mostly 
because of the latter’s political dimension. Hence, Gazprom 
faces a situation where any major involvement in a large-scale 
trade and investment project may be met with reluctance. Even 
from a business perspective, the continuous over-investment 
in new pipeline projects seems outdated in the context of the 
decline in gas demand in Europe combined with the growing 
volume of LNG trade. In the meantime, Gazprom’s own lique-
faction projects may face sanctions on access to technologies. 
Still, a cooperation on small LNG plants has been growing. 
Among the newest ones, Gazprom supplies gas for a small liq-
uefaction plant in Finland owned by Skangas. It remains to be 
seen if involvement into LNG business attenuates a vivid politi-
cization of the sector.
Ukraine remains the core di  culty, as it intends to implement 
the EU energy market rules following its recent accession to the 
Energy Community Treaty.  e implementation of these rules 
will mean that Gazprom will face new regulatory realities in 
Ukraine, especially with regard to capacity allocation and the 
transformation from a transit to an entry-exit system. Kiev’s 
unwillingness to continue importing Russian gas adds a new 
element to this concern.  e company has accordingly been 
driven to consider alternative pipeline options, all of which are 
subject to constraints either for political or for regulatory rea-
sons. As of now, Ukraine may become more vital for Gazprom 
than vice versa. However, instability in Ukraine itself combined 
with Kiev’s di  culties in reforming the gas sector, rather leaves 
Ukraine outside the full implementation of the Energy Com-
munity Treaty. Hence, Gazprom would be interested in a spe-
ci c transit agreement, exceptional in the Energy Community 
rules. Most probably such an agreement will be mediated by 
Brussels.
Gazprom increasingly appears incapable of quickly adapting to 
the new realities or of turning the situation to its own advan-
tage. Even low prices and competitive costs do not decisively 
reduce the political barriers it faces. Maybe common assump-
tions that Gazprom is a strong political tool are simply overes-
timated. Instead, its impact and power to in uence is declining 
despite a rather positive business context. Any market leverage 
gained still stems from exogenous factors (the market price 
and exchange rates), which do not come from Gazprom’s own 
strategy.
4 ■  FSR - Policy Brief ■ Issue 2016/05 ■ April 2016
Q
M
-A
I-1
6-
00
5-
EN
-N
 e Florence School of Regulation 
 e Florence School of Regulation (FSR) was founded in 2004 as a partnership between the Council of the European Energy 
Regulators (CEER) and the European University Institute (EUI), and it works closely with the European Commission.  e 
Florence School of Regulation, dealing with the main network industries, has developed a strong core of general regulatory 
topics and concepts as well as inter-sectoral discussion of regulatory practices and policies.
Complete information on our activities can be found online at:  fsr.eui.eu
Florence School of Regulation
Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies
European University Institute
Via delle Fontanelle 19
I-50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI)
Italy 
FSR Research Coordinator:
Ilaria.Conti@EUI.eu
Content © Authors, 2016
© European University Institute, 2016
